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Abstract
The network of Barabasi and Albert, a preferential growth model where a new node
is linked to the old ones with a probability proportional to their connectivity, is applied
to Brazilian election results. The application of the Sznajd rule, that only agreeing pairs
of people can convince their neighbours, gives a vote distribution in good agreement with
reality.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, it has been a matter of increasing interest [1] to apply the fundamentals of the
theories of complex systems in many different disciplines, not only in physical sciences, but even
in social sciences, from economy to education [2] or sociology. The main point is that social
systems, like natural ones, are constituted of great number of individuals, which - generally -
have local interactions between them. Sometimes, social networks behaviour can be determined
also by the action of external actors, which might be mimicked by external fields in our model.
Elections are processes where many individuals interact between them. It is a dynamical
convincing process, where we have at the same time the interaction between neighbours and
external influence (political advertising, campaigns etc). In Brazil, in proportional elections
(deputies or city councillors) the voters vote directly for the candidates and not for the parties.
They can vote for a party, but it is not frequent. Some elections occur with a large number
of voters: In some states or in the largest cities one has a number of voters in the order of
magnitudes of millions or tens of millions. So, these elections are a social phenomenon which
presents the basic characteristics of complex systems. One of these features is that they are
scale-free phenomena. This feature has been observed by Costa-Filho et al. [3], who showed
that the distribution of the number of votes obtained by different candidates for the 1998
elections in Brazil follow a power law distribution, with exponent ≃ −1.0. The same result can
be obtained for the whole country or for other proportional elections, which shows that this is
a very robust result.
Taking into account that elections are processes where a vote is supposed to be obtained
as a result of convincing arguments, it can be compared with a physical process of clustering.
However, contrary to the results obtained by Costa-Filho et al, usual models of formation of
clusters (as percolation, for instance [4]) may give exponents ≃ −2.0 (square lattice) for the
numbers of clusters as a function of the cluster size.
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Recently, we have introduced [5] a model for proportional elections. Our model is based on
the Sznajd model proposed to simulate the process of formation of opinion. However, different
from other models [6], where the influence flows inward from the border to the center (like in
the majority games, where the site in the middle takes the state of the majority of neighbouring
sites), in the Sznajd model [7, 8, 9, 10] one has an outward flow of influence. It thus differs
from e.g. bootstrap percolation [11] or other cellular automata (for a computational review see
[12]) where the site in the center behaves according to a rule determined by its neighbours.
Nevertheless, the dynamics of the Sznajd model is quite similar (except for isolated sites) to
that of spinodal decomposition of the Ising model [13] at low temperatures, as was shown in
[5]: Starting from a random distribution, large domains form where nearly all sites have the
same state. Finally, one domain will cover the whole lattice. Thus to get the desired results we
will look at intermediate times when there are still many different domains or correlated sites
in the system.
In the Sznajd model, small sets of people influence the opinions of their nearest neighbours
if and only if all people within the original set agree. On a chain, this set is a bond with two
people at its ends [7, 9]. On the square lattice with [10] or without [8] disorder, it can be
such a bond or a plaquette of four neighbouring spins (people). This plaquette rule is called
rule Ia in [8] and the bond rule, used in the present paper, is called rule IIa in [8]. Thus if
all four plaquette members or two bond members share the same opinion, they convince their
neighbours of this opinion; otherwise the neighbours remain unchanged.
However, as shown by Barabasi and Albert recently [14], social relations must be represented
by networks instead of lattices. Networks of interactions (www, author’s collaboration in sci-
entific papers, actor’s collaborations in films) show the common feature of scale-free behaviour.
In order to represent this main feature, Barabasi and Albert introduced a model for evolving
networks. Numerous papers used this model for a variety of purposes, e.g. [15]. Starting with
few nodes (which may represent actors, authors, web sites) connected to each other, more and
more nodes are added to the network, each node connecting to an already connected one, with
the probability to connect to a node being proportional to the number of previous nodes which
are already connected to it.
In Brazil the voting process is much more based on the relation between candidate/voter
than on the parties. Thus, our idealized version of the voting process can omit the role of the
parties. Another aspect is that it was clear for us that the candidates do not start with the
same social weight. This determines the result of the elections, since candidates with more
social visibility or better conditions to campaign are more likely to be elected. So, we have to
introduce some differentiation between the candidates in the beginning of the simulation.
In this paper, we performed simulations on a three-dimensional version of the previous one-
dimensional [7] and two-dimensional [8] Sznajd model. We combine it with a network model
for elections based on the model of Bernardes et al [5]. Unlike this first version [5] and its
three-dimensional variant where a probability to convince had to be introduced, eq.(1) below,
in order to produce some differentiation between the candidates, with the Barabasi network
the same result is obtained from the combination of the different number of neighbours of the
nodes without this probability.
In the next section we present the models we have used, followed by the results. Both of
these models use networks connecting the voters; one network is a simple cubic lattice, the
other a Barabasi network. After that, we conclude.
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2 Models and Results
We have simulated two models in the present work. The first one is a 3d version of that
simulated previously [5]. The second is a Barabasi network version.
2.1 Simple cubic lattice
In this work, we used a modified version of the Sznajd model (rule IIa in [8]): A pair of neigh-
bours in agreement convinces its ten nearest neighbours to the same opinion. A cubic lattice
of size L×L×L represents the set of voters. A number Ntot of candidates, Ntot ≪ L
3, is fixed
in the beginning of the simulation. The value n = 1, 2, . . . , Ntot of a site S on the lattice will
represent that this voter prefers that candidate n. The model has two different stages: First,
we produce the initial condition and, after that, we perform the simulation of the electoral cam-
paign (only voters can influence other voters, a la Sznajd). As in real elections, we do not wait
for a kind of equilibrium state, but count the votes at some intermediate time. Basically what
we are doing is the analysis during the transient time. As in real elections, the candidates have
different initial chances of being voted for (representing more money for electoral campaigns,
more initial visibility etc.). This is modelled by a probability Pc of convincing, calculated from
the label n of the candidate
Pc = (n/Ntot)
2 . (1)
It means that the higher is the label n of a candidate, the higher is the probability of convincing
a voter.
In the first stage, we started with all the sites with value zero, meaning that there are no
committed voters. Then, we visit all the sites exactly once, in random order. For each visit,
we try to convince the voter to adopt a candidate, chosen at random. A random number r is
generated and compared with Pc. If r ≤ Pc the candidate is accepted by that voter. If the
candidate convinces the voter, this voter tries to convince the neighbouring sites. Once again,
we throw the dice and compare a new random number with Pc. If successful, r ≤ Pc, the voter
will try to convince the neighbourhood as follows: We check all the six neighbouring sites; for
each that has the same value of the candidate chosen before, all the ten neighbouring sites
of this bond of two sites will assume the same value (as in the usual Sznajd prescription). If
nobody has chosen the same candidate, only the originally selected voter is committed to this
candidate.
In the second stage, a usual Sznajd process is performed without using the complication
from the probability Pc. (We thus assume all voters to be equal and restrict the probability
Pc to describe the convincing power of the candidates only.) We go to random sites on the
lattice. A neighbouring site is chosen at random and we check if the two sites have the same
value (they prefer the same candidate). In that case, all the ten neighbours change to vote in
that candidate.
Figure 1 shows, just as in real life [3], deviations from a simple power law for both very large
numbers of votes and very small numbers. In between, however, the simulations are compatible
with the hyperbolic law
N(v) ∝ 1/v (2)
observed in reality for the number N of candidates having v votes each. (Here and in Fig.2
below the bin size for v increases by a factor 2 for each consecutive bin.)
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Vote distribution, 10 simple cubic lattices 301^3, 200 candidates at t=50(x) and 100 (+); slope -1
Figure 1: Distribution N(v) of the number of candidates getting v votes each on the simple
cubic lattice, after 50 and 100 iterations. Election of 200 candidates by 27 million voters.
[In [5], for the square lattice and assumption (1), two exponents are fitted onto the data:
One for the distribution after the first stage, and one for the distribution during the second
change. When assumption (1) is generalized from ∝ n2 to ∝ nx, then the first exponent depends
strongly on x (which can be explained by a simple analytical relation between this exponent
and x), while the second exponent depends much less on x.]
2.2 Network version
In this model, we first create a network of interacting nodes by using the basic Barabasi-Albert
prescription. We fix an initial number of nodes, each one connected to the others. In the present
work, the minimum number of connections of a node is m = 5. So, in the beginning of the
simulation we have 6 nodes, in order that each one can be connected to the 5 others. After that,
more and more nodes are added to the network. A new node has a probability to be connected
to a previous node proportional to the number of nodes that are already connected to this
previous node. Thus the growth probability at any existing node is proportional to the number
of nodes already connected to it. We will no longer need assumption (1) and have replaced this
assumption and the regular lattice by the Barabasi network without such an assumption.
After preparing the network, we start with the election process, which is now different from
that in the previous three-dimensional model. The first step is the distribution of candidates.
Again, the state of a node, that means, the value n of a node on the network, represents that
this voter has given the preference to that candidate n. Thousand candidates are distributed
at random, disregarding the number of connections of a node, i.e. we pick a node at random
from the half million nodes to which we let the network grow, and then a candidate at random.
Now, the campaign starts. At each time step we visit all the nodes. For each node, we have
the following process:
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• If a node i has already selected preference for a candidate, we choose a connected node j
at random. If node i has no candidate (n = 0), we go to another randomly selected node.
• If node j has the same candidate as node i, they try to convince all the nodes connected
with them. The probability to convince others for each of the two nodes is now inversely
proportional to the time-independent numbers of nodes connected with it, meaning that
each node convinces - on average - one other node at each process.
• If node j has no candidate, node i tries to convince it to accept its own candidate, with
the same probability as described above.
• If node j has a different candidate from node i, we skip to another node i.
Again, as described above for the 3d version, we do not wait for a equilibrium state. It is
important to mention that, different from a square lattice, where an equilibrium state is reached
in a time proportional to the number of sites, in the network it is reached rapidly, after about
102 iterations. In both cases, in final equilibrium all the sites have the same state.
Figure 2 shows that again except for the smallest and the largest numbers v of votes, the
hyperbolic law (2) is obeyed well at intermediate times t = 40.
3 Summary
Whether we simulate the election process on a square lattice, a simple cubic lattice or a Barabasi
network, we recover the same hyperbolic law as found in real elections. Our simulations on a
Barabasi network have the advantage that we no longer need assumption (1) for the purpose
of getting a realistic vote distribution with decay exponent 1 in the center.
Our study has shown that the hyperbolic law observed empirically is a rather robust conse-
quence of our modifid Sznajd model, since we found it first on the square lattice [5] and now on
both the cubic lattice and the Barabasi network. Either we use a regular lattice and assumption
(1), or we use the Barabasi network without assumption (1); the final results are similar. The
fact that the hyperbolic law is observable on the Barabasi network, which is a more realistic
model of social interactions than the lattices, provides evidence that the Sznajd model may
well capture important aspects of the voting mechanism. The advantage of using the Barabasi
network instead of regular lattices is not only that it is more realistic but also that we can drop
assumption (1) which is a kind of fine tuning the system to criticality. Of course, the Barabasi
model, and the related assumptions are also rules (as we have rules when constructing a lat-
tice too) but the difference is similar to what we have for usual and self-organized criticality:
Assumption (1) puts in some exponent at the beginning, through (n/Ntot)
2, on which the final
exponent depends somewhat (see end of section 2.1), while the Barabasi growth process leads
by itself to a power-law distribution of the number of connections for a node, and combined
with the Sznajd model gives the desired vote distribution with its intermediate power law.
Moreover, rule (1) was introduced ad hoc to explain the election results, while the rules of
[14] were stated before, independent of the present application. We are not aware of other voter
models[16] explaining the hyperbolic law found empirically in [3].
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Vote distribution, Barabasi network (+) at t=40, and real votes 1998 MG/Brazil (x, multiplied by 10)
Figure 2: Distribution N(v) for half a million nodes on the Barabasi network, where each
previously added node bonds to five previously added nodes. Election of 1000 candidates (+).
The number of votes in real elections (×: state of Minas Gerais in Brazil 1998) is multiplied
by ten for better comparison.
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